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ABSTRACT
Current d y n a m i sm  of T ha il an d' s m a n u fa ct ur ed  export is leading to a 
rapid change in the s t r u c tu re  of ex p o r t s  and p r oduction. At the same time, 
mai n l y  be c a u s e  of the de c l i n e  of traditional a g ri c u l t u r e  and the c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
of m a n uf a c t u r i n g  around the capital region, the p ro pl em  of income d is pa ri ti es , 
which had been w o r s e n in g over the last decade, is likely to get worse. This 
paper d e s c r i be s the recent ch a n g e s  in the Thai economy, and the va r i o u s  
i m b a l a nc e s  that exist. It e xa mi ne s the i m balance be t w e e n  the s t r u c t u r e  of 
p ro du c ti on  and of em p l o y m e n t ,  and the re l a t e d  locational i m b a l a n c e  b e tween
I
p ro du ct i on  and p o pulation. The paper also looks at the appar e n t  i m b a l a n ce  in 
the educational e n ro l l m e n t  p a ttern in Thail a n d  when c om pa re d to other Asian 
countries. An a n a l y s is  is given to show that the e n ro ll me nt  p a ttern can be 
e xp la in e d when account is taken of the stru c t u r e  of e mp lo ym en t and the way the 
labour market functions. Finally, the paper d i s c u s s es  some key issues for the 
f u t u r e .
P R O D U C T I O N  ST R U C T U R E S ,  LAB O U R  M AR K E T S  AND 
H U MAN C A PITAL INVESTMENTS:
ISSUES OF B A LANCE FOR T HA IL AN D
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
With current rapid e x p a n s io n oT T ha il an d' s m a n u T a c t u r e d  exports, and the 
general d e cline oT traditional a g r i cu lt ur e through out the 1900's, some f un da m e n t a l  
ch a n g e s  in the p a ttern of econo m i c  growth are underway. At the same time, there are 
major imb a l a n c e s  that c ur re nt ly  exist between the e m p l o y m en t and p o p u la ti on  
struct u r e s ,  and the p ro du ct io n structure. These have also led to appar e n t  
imb a l a n c e s  in the s t r u c t u r e  of e d u c a t io n in T h a i l a n d  when c o m p a re d with other 
countries. This paper will ex a m i n e  recent changes in the growth pattern, and the 
va r i o u s  imbalances. This will h i g h l ig ht  issues that have to be solved for the 
future.
Section 2 d e s c r i be s  the c ha ng es  in the p a ttern of e c o n o m i c  growth. In 
s e ction 3, the i m balance b e tween the s t r u c t ur e of e mp l o y m e n t  and of p r o d u c t i o n  is 
examined. The d i s - p r o p o r t i o n a t e  share of e m pl oy me nt  in a g r i c u l t u r e  c o mp a r e d  to the 
share of a g r ic ul tu re  in v a l u e - a dd ed  has led to large d i s p a r i t i e s  in in c o m e s  b e tween 
a g r i c u l tu re  and n o n - ag r ic ul tu re , and the gap has been w id en in g over the last decade. 
S e ction 4 looks at the i m ba la nc e be t w e e n  the location of p o p u l a t i o n  and the l o c a t i o n  
of p r oduction. This has led to large and w i d e n i n g  d i s p a r i t i e s  of i n comes be t w e e n  
regions. The need for the future is to ac h i e v e  better b al an c e  of p o p u l a t i o n  and 
e m p l o ym en t with production.
Section 5 e x a m i ne s the educat i o n a l  e n r o l l me nt  pa t t e r n  in T h a i l a nd  in 
r e l a t i o n  to the s t r u c t ur e  of the labour market. C om pa r e d  to other Asian c o u n t ri es , 
T h a i l a n d  seems to have r e l a t i v e l y  low e nr ol lm en t at the s ec on da ry  levels, and rather 
high e n r o l l m en t in higher eduction. This pa t t e r n  is e x p l a i n ed  with r e f e r e n c e  to 
what is known about the labour market and the r ew ar d s  from e d u c at io n in Thailand.
It is shown that the appar e n t  i m b a l an ce  is re l a t e d  to the i mb al an ce  al r e a d y
i n dicated on the e m p l o y m en t  side. Taking v a rious e c o n o m ic  s tr uc tu re s into account, 
the c u rrent ed u c a t i o n a l  p a tt e r n  is easy to u n derstand. However, with expected 
c h anges in the f ut u r e  to c o rrect the i m ba la nc es  d i s c u s s ed  in s e c t i o ns  3 and 4 , the 
educational s t r u c t u r e  n e eds to d e ve l o p  in c on f o r m i t y  with the other changes. 
Finally, se c t i o n  6 concludes.
I
2. E ME RG IN G S T R U C T UR AL  CHANGE AND T R A N S I T IO N TO NIC S T A T U S 1
A prom i n e n t  feature of T h ai la nd 's  recent e c o n o m i c  p e r f o r m a n c e  has been the 
rapid growth of m a nu f a c t u r e d  exports. 1985 was a s i g n if ic an t year for m a n u f a c t u r e d  
exports. It was the first year in which m an uf a c t u r e d  e x po r t s  s u r p a s se d a g r i c u lt ur al  
ex p o r t s  in value. Since that year, the boom in m a n u f a c t u r e d  e xp or ts  has been 
phenomenal. Within two years, from 1984 to 1986, the r a tio of m a n u f a c t u r e d  ex p o r t s  
to a g r i cultural exports incr e a s e d  from .97 to 1.63. With c o nt in ue d boom this year, 
the ratio will rise to over 2.
The rapid growth of m an uf a c t u r e d  e x po rt s has more than c o mp e n s a t e d  for the 
de c l i n e  of T h a i l an d' s tradit i o n a l  major exports, i.e. the 5 major crops c o n s i s t i n g  
of Rice, Rubber, Maize, S u g a r c an e  and Tapioca. Table 2.1 shows e x po r t s  in m il li o n s  
of US dollars by major groupings; also given are the sha r e s  in total export, the 
yearly growth rates, and the av e r a g e  growth b e tween 1980 and 1986. The first thing 
that can be seen is the rapid d ec li ne  in the share of the 5 major crops in total 
exports, p a r t i cu la rl y over the last two years. In 1981, the share of the major 
crops were 4 6 . 8 ’/.. In 1986, this was 30.77.. The growth rate of major crops' e xp or t s  
has been f lu ct u a t i n g  almost yearly. This d e pe n d s  on c o m m o d i t y  pri c e s  in the 
p a rt i c u l a r  year, and also on pr o d u c t i o n .  As a result, b et we e n  1980 and 1986, the 
a v erage growth of export of the 5 major crops have shown a slight d o w n w ar d trend.
While other crops have fared s l ig ht ly  better than the major crops, the trend 
of their exports has been b a s i c a l ly  s t agnant, only r e g i s t e r i n g  an a ve ra g e  growth of
1.77. per annum between 1980 and 1986. A n other group with a d ow nw ar d trend (this 
time a rather sharp d o w n w a r d  trend) is the mining group. Again this r e f l e c t s  the 
downw a r d  trend in world prices. In fact, all the g r ou ps  that have p e r f o r m ed  p oo r l y  
are the group of pr i m a r y  c o m m o di ti e s,  r e f l e c t in g an a dv er se  d e m a n d - s u p p l y  s i t u a t i o n  
in the world market for pr i m a r y  c o m m o d i t i e s  generally.
1. T h i s  s e c t i o n  i s  m o s t l y  f r o m  s e c t i o n s  2 . 1  a n d  2 . 2  i n  T D R I  ( 1 9 8 7 ) .
4TABLE 2.1 
TOTAL VALUE OF EX P O R T S
(MILLIONS
CATEG O R Y 1 980 1981
5 MAJOR CROPS 2778 3272
OTHER CROPS 247 286
MINING 599 448
L I VE ST OC K & FISHERY 281 331
CANNED FOODS EXC. FISH 117 139
CANNED FISH 29 50
C L O T H I N G 507 629
GEMS AND JEWELRY 1B3 229
OTHER INDUSTRIES 579 537
OTHERS 1164 1070
TOTAL 6489 6995
SHARE 1980 1981
5 MAJOR CROPS 42.8 46.8
OTHER CROPS 3.8 4. 1
MINING 9.2 6.4
L I V E ST OC K & FI S H E R Y 4.3 4.7
CAN N E D  FOODS EXC. FISH 1. B 2.0
CANNED FISH 0.5 0.7
C L O T H I N G 7.8 9.0
GEMS AND J E WELRY 2.8 3.3
OTHER INDUSTRIES 8.9 7.7
OTHERS 17.9 15.3
TOTAL 100.0 100. 0
GROWTH 1980 1981
5 MAJOR CROPS 17.7 17.8
OTHER CROPS 18.1 15.8
MINING 21.2 -25.3
L I V E ST OC K & FI S H E R Y -5.7 17.7
CAN N E D  FOODS EXC. FISH 15.5 18.3
CAN N E D  FISH 60. 7 72.6
C L O T H I N G 8.9 24. 1
GEMS AND JEWELRY 36.7 24. 7
OTHER I N D U STRIES 57.6 -7. 1
OTHERS 39.3 -8.1
TOTAL 22. 7 7.8
)F US DOLLARS)
1982 1983 1984 1985 19B6
3167vl
348
2696
275
2993
275
. 2389 
286
2696
274
' * -( o
359 246 247 226 128
359 356 372 383 595
150 153 211 199 213
72 91 156 191 322
676 707 910 966 1323
227 314 31 1 313 499
500 504 666 644 839
1067 1007 1253 1506 1881
6929 6354 7397 7106 8775
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
45.7 42. 4 40.5 33. 6 30. 7
5.0 4.3 3.7 4.0 3. 1
5.2 3.9 3.3 3.2 1.5
5.2 5.6 5.0 5.4 6.8
2.2 2.4 2.9 2.8 2.4
1. 0 1. 4 2. 1 2.7 3.7
9.8 11.1 12.3 13.6 15. 1
3.3 4.9 4.2 4.4 5.7
7.2 7.9 9.0 9. 1 9.6
15.4 15.9 16.9 21. 2 21. 4
100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
AV. GR
1982 19B3 1984 1985 1986 8 0 -86
-3.2 -14.9 11.0 -2.0. 2 12.9 -0.5
21.4 -20. 9 -0. 1 4. 1 -4. 1 1. 7
-19.7 -31.4 0. 4 -8.6 -43. 2 - 2 2 . 6
8.5 -0.9 4.6 2.9 55. 2 13.3
8. 1 1 . 8 37. 8 -5.5 6. 7 10.4
42.5 27. 1 70. 0 22.6 68. 6 49. 1
7.5 4.6 28. 6 6.2 37. 0 17.3
-0.6 38. 0 -0.8 0.4 59. 6 18. 1
-7.0 0.9 32.0 -3.3 30. 2 6.4
-0.3 -5.6 24. 4 20.2 25. 0 8.3
-0.9 -8.3 16.4 -3.9 23. 5 5.2
Source: C a lc ul at ed  From Bank of T h a i l a n d  M on th l y  B u l l e ti n
(various issues), table 35.
ttrkJ
All other groups (except -for the "others") r eg i s t e r e d  an a v erage growth at 
10'/. per annum or more b e tween 1900 and 1986. The -fastest growth has been r e g i s t e r e d  
by "canned fish" (mostly tuna), and its share in total export has incr e a s e d  r ap id l y  
from just 0.57. in 1980 to around 3.77. in 1986. An impo r t a n t  group in terms of both 
its growth perfo r m a n c e ,  and b ec au s e  it share is a lr ea d y  sizable, is the " c l o thing" 
group, including t e x t i l e s  and garments. This group a l re a d y  has a 15.17. share of 
total export, and r eg is te re d an a v erage growth of 17.37. be t w e e n  19B0 and 1986. A 
h y p o thetical c a l c u l at io n shows that if "clothing" c o n t i n u e s  with this av e r a g e  growth 
over the next few years, and if the "major crops" also c o nt i n u e  along its past 
trend, then in 1991, the last year of the Sixth F i v e - y e ar  Plan, export of c lo th in g 
would surpass those of the 5 major export crops combined. In fact, it may happen 
much sooner than that, as ex p o r t s  of t e x t i l e s  have grown by over 457. over the first
9 months of 1987 c o m p a r e d  to the same period in 1 9 8 6 . 2
The rapid increase in m an uf a c t u r e d  ex p o r t s  has been w id e- s p r e a d .  It is not 
limited to just a few large p r oduct groups. C u r r e n t ly  small export items are also 
e xp a n d i n g  rapidly, and f o l l o w in g the recent trends, their i m p o r t a nc e will bec o m e  
more visible in a few years. One group which is now very p r om in en t in the export 
p ic tu r e  is the "gems and jewelry" group. S t a r t i n g  from a base of 2.87. share of 
total export in 1980, the share incr e a s e d  r ap id l y  to 5.77. in 1986. This year this 
group is likely to regis t e r  a growth rate of over 607.. Shortly, its total export 
value is likely to pass the one bi l l i o n  dollar mark. A n other group which will 
become more i m portant over the next few y e ars c on si st s of toys and s p or ti ng  goods. 
These have r e gi st er ed  an av e r a g e  rate of growth of 53.87. per annum b et we e n  1982 and
1985. The growth rate b et we e n  1985 and 1986 was similar. W h ile the cu r r e n t  export 
value of this group is only 30 m i ll i o n  dollars, the impact of an a c c u m u l a t i o n  in a 
growth rate of this size should not be u n d e re st im at ed . For example, if its rate of
growth c o n t i n u e s  at the 507. level yearly, then in just over 8 years, its export
value will s u rpass the one bi l l i o n  dollar mark..
2 . Fr o m  B a n  k o  f T h a  i 1 a n d  " E c p n o m i c  Si t uat. i o n  i n F  i r s  t 9  M o n  t h s  o f
1987".
6The recent exce l l e n t  manuf actur i ng export p e r f o r m a n c e  i n dicates that 
Thail a n d  has been able to push s t r o n g l y  into the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  export market.
Thailand is also b e n e f it i ng  from the t r an si ti on  of the other Asian NIC's towards 
c om mo d it ie s other than the traditional labour inte n s i v e  m a n u f a c t u r e d  exports, such 
as textiles. The Asian NIC's such as Korea and Taiwan have p r ob a b l y  re a c h e d  a point 
where they are no longer c o mp e t i t i v e  in most of these items. Korea is turning 
towards more capital and t e c h n o lo gy  i n t e n si ve  e x ports such as motor cars, and Taiwan 
is c ur re nt ly  d om in at in g the world with " c o m p a t i b l e "  de s k t o p  c o m p uters. That 
Thail a n d  has been able to fill in the void left by these other c o u n tr ie s is a good 
sign. We seem to have been able to s u cceed in both the p r o d u c t i o n  of better q ua li ty  
p r o d u c t s  at c o mp e t i t i v e  prices, and also in getting the f o reign c o n s u m e rs  to think 
about Thailand as a source for a wide range of m a n u f a c t u r e d  products.
Of major i m p o r ta nc e  also has been the e xc ha ng e rate pol i c y  that has been 
f a l l o w e d  in recent years. The b a h t / d o ll ar  rate has c h an g e d  r e l a t i v e l y  little s i nce 
the end of 1985, with a slight a p p r e c i a t i o n  of the baht r el at i v e  to the dollar of 
about 3. 257.. However, during that time the dollar has d ep r e c i a t e d  a g ainst the yen 
by 32.37., the Deuts c h e  mark by 30.97., and even against the pound s t e r l i ng  by
14.157..3 Effec t i v e l y ,  the baht has d ep r e c i a t e d  against the c ur re n c y  of our a ve ra g e  
trading p a r t n e r s  s ig n i f i c a n t l y .
Given the boom in m a n u f a c t u r e d  exports, many are m e n t i o n i n g  T h a i l an d as the 
leader of the second wave of the NIC's. On this point, a c o m p ar is on  b et we en  K or e a  
and Thail a n d  is illuminating. Table 2.2 g i ves s e l e c te d data for T h a i l a n d  and for 
South Korea from 1950 till 1984. Included are data on p op ul a t i o n ,  p o p u l a t i o n  gro w t h  
rate, GDP in local currency, e x ch a n g e  rate, per capita GDP, a ve ra g e  m e r c h a n d i s e  
export growth, and the share of e mp lo ym en t in a g r i c u l t u r e .
This series shows up some very i n te re st in g d i f f e r e n c e s  in the his t o r i c a l  
d e ve l o p m e n t  p a tt er ns  of the two countries. The most n o t e w o r t h y  d i f f e r e n c e  is in the 
trends of the e x c h a n g e  rates. The rate of e x c h a ng e b e tw e e n  the bath and the US
3. T h i s  i s  a s  o f  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  N o v e m b e r  1 9 8 7 .  Ely t h e  e n d  o f  
D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 7 ,  t h e  U S  d o l l a r  h a s  f u r t h e r  d e p r e c i a t e d  a g a i n s t  o t h e r  
m a j o r  c u r r e n c i e s .
dollar had hardly c h anged in nearly 35 years! Of c o ur s e  if there was data for 1905, 
one would see the b a ht /d o ll ar  rate rising to 27.2 baht per US dollar. However, this 
is i ns ig ni f i c a n t  c o m p a r e d  to what has h a p p e n e d  to the won over the last 30 years or 
so. Ignoring the period b e tween 1950 and 1955, during which the Korean war took 
place, the won d e p r e c ia te d against the dollar by 1,5127. be t w e e n  1955 and 1984, or an 
average of 107. per year. Even since 1965, the won had d e p r e c i a t e d  against the 
dollar by an a v erage 67. per year.
However, the e x c h a n ge  rate data cannot be i n t e r p r et ed  w i thout r e f e r e n ce  to 
the d i f f erential rates of i n flation that have taken p l ace in the two c o u n tries, and 
r e l a t i v e  to their major trading partners. Table 2.3 shows a d j u s t e d  ser i e s  of real 
e x c h a n g e  rate indices for the two c o u n t r i es  since 1960 to 1985. To adjust for 
inflation, we first c o n s t r u c t  an index for each, giv i n g  the price index for each 
co u n t r y  r e l a t i ve  to that of the U S . 4 We then de f l a t e  the nominal e x ch an ge  rate of 
each c o untry with r e spect to the US dollar by the series, and c al cu la te  an index of 
the real excha n g e  rate with r e spect to the US dollar since 1960. If the value of 
the index incr e a s e s  then this means that the c u rr en cy  is d e p r e c i a t i n g  ag a i n s t  the US 
dollar, and vice versa, if the index d e c r e a s e s  then the c ur re n c y  is a p p r e c i a t i n g  
agai nst the dollar.
Looking at the series, we can see that the Thai and Kor e a n  real e xc ha ng e
rate took a d i fferent path in the first half of the 6 0 ’s. The won d e p r e c i a t e d
against the dollar by over 1007. be t w e e n  1960 and 1965, while the baht a p p r e c i a t e d
against the dollar in real terms b e tween those two dates. The ma s s i v e  d e p r e c i a t i o n
of the won against the dollar be t w e e n  1960 and 1965 had o b v i o u s ly  been an i m p o r ta nt  
source of the phenomenal growth of Korean exports, which grew by over 387. per a n num 
in dollar value between 1960 and 1975, and by 287. per annum b e tw e e n  1975 and 1980.
4. U s i n g  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  as; a  g r o u p  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  IJ8 i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  w o u l d  l e a d  t o  a  s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n .
8TABLE 2.2
SELEC T E D  DATA ON T H A I L A ND  AND SOUTH K O REA
THAIL A N D
YEAR P O P U L A TI ON
POP
GROWTH GDP EX. RATE
PER
CAP I T A
AVG.
EXPORT
GROWTH
7.EMPL0Y
IN
( ’000) RATE B I L . B A H T (BAHT/I) GDP (US*) AGRIC
1950 20620 n . a . 26.2 22. 34 > F] 56. 9 n . a . n . a .
1955 23536 2. 77. 38. 1 21.64 74.8 n . a . n . a .
1960 27039 2. 87. 54 21. 18 2 * ^  94.3 3. 97. 84. 07.
1965 31359 3. 07. 84.3 20.80 ^ ,v 129 < 2 B. 57. 82. 17.
1970 36431 3. 07. 136. 1 20.80 ■ 179.6 2. 47. 80. 07.
1975 41869 2. 87. 298. 8 20. 38 i* u 3 5 0.2 26. 07. 78. 17.
1980 46950 2. 37. 684. 9 20. 48 7 1 2 . 4 24. 37. 70. 87.
1984 50400 1. 87. 991.56 23.64 ^ 8 3 2 . 3 3. 37. 69. 77.
KOREA
AVG.
POP PER EXPORT 7.EMPL0Y
YEAR P OP UL A TI ON GROWTH GDP EX . R A T E CAP I T A GROWTH IN
( ’000) RATE BI L . W O N ( W O N / * ) GDP (US*) AGRIC
1950 20357 n . a . 2 2. 50 49. 1 n . a . n . a .
1955 21467 1. 17. 113 50. 00 105.4 n . a . n . a .
1960 25012 3. 17. 243 63.75 i 152.5 12. 97. 66. 07.
1965 28705 2.87. 798 266.27 104.4 39. 67. 58.37.
1970 32241 2. 47. 2672 310.57 * ^  266.9 38. 27. 50.07.
1975 352B1 1. 87. 9951 484.00 ^  r,i 582. 8 41.57. 41. 97.
1980 38198 1. 67. 35380 607.43 *  - 1524. 8 28.07. 34.07.
1984 40580 1. 57. 67126 805.98 2052.4 11.27. 29.77.
Source: International M on et ar y Fund, Year Book o-f I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Financial St a t i s t i c s ,  1986, tfor n o n - e m p l o y m e n t  data. 
E m p l o y me nt  data From IBRD World Tables, 3rd edition, 
volume 2; a 1 s a from IBRD, "Korea: D e v e lo pm en t in a Global 
C on te xt " ,a  World Bank C ou nt r y  Study, 1983; and also from 
NSO Labour Force Surveys.
Note: * refers to 1983.
TABLE 2.3 
E X C H A N G E  RATES A D J U S T ED  FOR 
RELATIVE I N FLATION D I FF ER EN CE S
REAL E XC H AN GE  RATE INDEX 
R E L A T I V E  TO 
US 1
KOREA T H A I L A N D
I960 100. 0 100. 0
1961 184. 4 93.5
1962 181.9 90. 4
1963 153. 5 91.3
1964 197. 0 93.2
1965 219. 1 94.5
1966 204. 3 93.5
1967 189. 0 92.0
1968 181.1 94. 5
1969 176. 2 97.8
1970 172.3 104. 2
1971 176. 5 108.5
1972 184. 3 106. 7
1973 192. 6 96. 4
1974 172. 6 83. 9
1975 177. B 87.3
1976 162. 4 88.9
1977 156. 6 87.9
1977 146. 5 87.3
1979 136. 9 88.9
1980 149. 1 84. 0
1981 150. 8 87.5
1982 160. 1 93. 1
1983 169. 5 92. 6
1984 179. 7 98.5
1985 196. 2 114.6
Source: C a l c ul at ed  from data in I nt e r n a t i o n a l  M on et ar y 
Fund, Financial S t a t i s ti c s,  1986.
For Thailand, ex p o r t s  grew -fairly slowly b et we e n  1960 and 1970. It was 
clear that the real a p p r e c i at io n of the baht against the dollar since 1960 had 
c o n t r i bu te d to this. Then b e tween 1970 and 1980, export growth picked up sharply, 
with an average growth of around 2 5 ’/. per annum be t w e e n  1970 and 1980. This was 
partly because of incr e a s e s  in c o mm od it y prices in the 70's, par t l y  be c a u s e  of the 
higher rate o f . i nf l at io n during the period due to the increase in oil prices, and 
also may have been due to the t e m p o ra ry  real d e p r e c i a t i o n  of the baht against the 
dollar between 1970 and 1971 due to lower i n flation in T h a i l a nd  c o m p a r e d  to that in 
the US. Between 1980 and 1984, ex p o r t s  bec a m e  s l u g q is h again, due to the d e cl in in g 
trend in c om m o d i t y  pri c e s  and the o v e r - v a lu ed  e xc ha ng e rate at the time, even with 
the slight d ev al ua ti o n in 1981. A second d e va l u a t i o n  at the end of 1984, and the 
policy since 1984 of staying very much with the dollar (as i n d i c a t e d  above) see m e d  
to have been the push n ec es sa ry  to get e x ports goinq again, and s t a r t i n g  from last 
year, exports (par t i c u l a r l y  manuf a c t  bred exports) had o b v i o u s l y  responded.
In 1950, T h a i l a n d  had a higher level of per c ap i t a  GDP than South Korea. By 
1960, per capita GDP in Korea was 627. higher than for Thailand. However, this is 
p r o b a b l y  illusory, as the won was p r o b a bl y highly o v e r - v a l u e d  against the dollar at 
this time, with the h y p e r - i n f l a t i o n  as a result of the Korean war. B e tw e e n  1960 and 
1965, the won d e p r ec i at ed  against the dollar by 3187.. The result was that GDP per 
capita in dollar terms b e ca m e  higher for T h a i l a n d  again, with a level of 129.2 
do l l a r s  for T h a i l a n d  and 104.4 d o ll a r s  for Korea. Howev e r ,  the ma s s i v e  real 
d ep re ci a ti on  of the won against the dollar between 1960 and 1965 was d e ci s i v e  in 
pu s h i n g  Korea on the path of a c ce l e r a t e d  e x p o rt -l ed  gro w t h  be t w e e n  1960 and 1980. 
Within 10 years (from 1965), per cap i t a  GDP in Korea was 667. higher than in 
Thailand. Within 15 years (in 1980), the d i ff er en ti al  i nc r e a s e d  to 1147., and in 
1984 the d if fe re nc e was 146.67..
Currently, T h a i l a n d  is p r ob ab ly  at the stage that Korea was around 1975.
The nominal per capita GDP in Korea at that time was 5 8 2.8 d o ll ar s which is lower 
than the current Thai level. But with the i n flation that had taken place since 
1975, the real per c a pi t a  GDP in Korea in 1975 was s l ig h t l y  higher than the cu r r e n t  
Thai level. P o pu la ti o n growth rate in Korea for 1975 was also similar to that in 
Thail a n d  today. Export p e r f o r m a n c e  was also similar, if we take into a c co u n t  the
\ (a t rc> .-y
s tr u c t u r e  o-f exports. A l t h o u g h  Korean ex p o r t s  were gr o w i n g  at around 407. per annum 
in dollar terms in 1975, 90 7. o-f its ex p o r t s  were from m a n u f a ct ur in g.  C ur re nt ly  in 
Thailand m a n u f ac tu re d e x ports are also gr o w i n g  at around 35-407. per a n n u m . 3
The share of GDP from a g r i c u l tu re  was sligh t l y  higher in Korea in 1975
compared to the current Thai situation, with the share of a g r i c u l tu re  in GDP (at
factor cost) for Korea of about 24 7. in 1975, c o m p a r e d  to around 197. for T h a i l a n d  in
1986. One major d if fe re n ce  b e tween the Kor e a n  s i t u a t io n in 1975 and the current 
Thai s i tuation however lies in the s t r u ct ur e of employ m e n t .  W he re a s  in 1975, the 
share of agricultural e m p l o y me n t in Korea was 427., in T h a i l a nd  the share was about 
677. in 1986,* and this in spite of the fact that the share of a g ri c u l t u r e  in GDP was 
higher in Korea in 1975 compa r e d  to the level in T h a i l a nd  in 1986.
It is this p r e d o m in an t i n f l u e n c e  of a g r i c u l tu re  on the e m pl oy me nt  p r o s p e c ts
of the current Thai labour force that makes any talk of T h a i l a n d  r e a c h i ng  so called 
"NIC" status in the near future seems i r r e l ev an t for the m a jo ri ty  of the popula t i o n .  
At the very same time that m a n u f a c t u r e d  e xp or t s  were b o om i n g  in 1986 and 1987, 
a g r i c u lt ur e was going t h rough a second very bad year in s u c c e s s io n due to two bad 
d r o u g h t s  in a row. Even ignoring the droughts, the per i o d  since the early 1980's 
has been a dismal one for tradit i o n a l  a g r i c u l tu re  in Thailand.
The d e cline of tr a d i t i o n a l  a g ri c u l t u r e  in T ha il an d is r ef le ct ed  in the rapid 
d e c r e a s e  in the share of crops in GDP, S e e ( ta bl e 2.4). In 1982, v al u e - a d d e d  at 
current factor cost from crops made up 18.37. of GDP, by 1986 this had fallen to
12.77.. Only 10 years ago in 1977 it was 22. 17. . 7
5. A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  I B R D  W o r l d  D e b t  t a b l e ,  ( 1 9 E 3 5 - 6  e d i t i o n ) ,  e v e n  
t h e  r a t i o  o f  l o n g - t e r m  e x t e r n a l  d e b t  t o  G D P  i s  s i m i l a r .  In 1 9 7 5  K o r e a  
h a d  a  r a t i o  o-f l o n g - t e r m  e x t e r n a l  d e b t  t o  G D P  o f  29.8"/., w h e r e a s  t h e  
r a t i o  g i v e n  f o r  T h  a  i 1 a n  d f o r  1 9 8 4  w a s  26.1"/.. T h i s  l a t t e r  r a t i o  i s  
h o w e v e r  s o m e w h a t  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  3 2 . 4 7 .  e s t i m a t e d  b y  T D R I  f o r  T h a i l a n d  
i n  1 9 8 4 .  ( B e e  T D R I  ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  t a b l e  2 . 5 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  w h i c h e v e r  e s t i m a t e  i s  
t. a  k e n  , t. h e  r a t  i o s  a r  e  i n d e e d  s i m  i 1 a r  .
6. B a s e d  o n  p r e l i m i n a r y  d a t a  f r o m  N S G  L a b o u r  F o r c e  S u r v e y ,  J u l y —  
S e p t e m b e r ,  1 9 8 6 .
7. C a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  N E S D B , N a t i o n a l  I n c o m e  o f  T h a i l a n d ,  O l d  S e r i e s  
1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 4 .
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TABLE 2.4
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AT CU R R E N T  FACTOR COST BY I N DU S T R I A L  ORIGIN
1982 1986
M I LL I ON S 7. OF M I L L I O NS 7. OF
OF BAHT GDP OF BAHT GDP
A G RI CU LT UR E IBB, 147 24.7 182,311 18.7
CROPS 139,423 18.3 124,375 12.7
L I V E S T O C K 2 3 ,5 9 6 3. 1 26,653 2.7
F I S H E R IE S 14,141 1.9 17,555 1.8
FORESTRY 10,987 1. 4 13,728 1. 4
NON A G R I C U LT UR E 5 7 4, 0 75 75. 3 7 9 4,783 B 1. 3
MINING AND Q U A R R YI NG 12,092 1.6 19,983 2.0
M A N U F A C T U R I N G 133,123 17.5 178,311 18.2
C O N S TR UC TI ON 41,611 5.5 54, 6 6 8 5.6
E L EC T R I C I T Y  AND WATER SUPPLY 14,682 1 . 9 28, 128 2.9
T R A N S P OR T AND C O M M U N I C A T I O N 62,451 8.2 101 ,096 10.3
W H O L E SA L E AND RETAIL TRADE 124,209 16.3 146,242 15.0
B A NKING INSURANCE AND REAL ESTATE 56, 4 7 6 7.4 03, 7 4 8 8.6
O W N E R SH IP  OF D W E L L I NG S 8 ,7 0 3 1 . 1 13,002 1.3
PUBLIC A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  AND DEFENCE 3 7 ,3 4 9 4.9 49,139 5.0
SERVI C E S 8 3, 3 7 9 10.9 120,466 12.3
GROSS DOMES T I C  P R ODUCT (GDP) 7 62 ,2 2 2 100. 0 9 7 7,094 100. 0
Source: Table 3 in NESDB, National Income of Thailand, 
1986 edition, Su m m a r y  Tables.
Within the crops group, the five major a g r i c u lt ur al  export items - rice, 
rubber, maize, s u ga rc an e and c a ss a v a  - are p r e d o m i n a n t .  They a c c o u n te d for 63.77. of 
the GDP from crops in 1986. In fact, these major crops t o g e t h e r  with fru i t s  and 
v e g e t ab le s a c c o u n t e d  for B5.57. of GDP from crops in 1986. The i m p o r t an ce  of the 5 
major crops has remai n e d  at about the same level as in 1975. In 1973, these major 
crops accounted for 63.97. of total v a l u e - a d d e d  from crops, a fig u r e  almost e xa ct l y  
the same as in 1986 (63.77.). Of course, wit h i n  these 5 crops, there have been major 
changes, with the share of paddy d e cl in in g in general, and those for other crops 
f l u c t u a ti ng  d ep e n d i n g  on what h a p p e ne d to their prices in p a r t i c u la r years. 
N ev e r t h e l e s s ,  a p r o m i ne nt  fe a t u r e  of the d e v e lo pm en t over the past 10 years is that
these major crops as a group have acco u n t e d  for a very sta b l e  share of GDP from all 
c r o p s .
The fortunes of these major crops over a period of time are d ep e n d e n t  on 
their price trends, and within a par t i c u l a r  year, are also d e p e n d en t on the v a g a r i e s  
of the weather. On the last point, 1987 will be the second c o n s e c u t i v e  bad year for 
the major crops in aggregate. In 1986, real GDP growth for a g r i c u l t u r e  was -0.77., 
with the decline coming from crops, where the growth rate was -2.27.. Other s u b ­
sectors showed good growth, such as 3.87. for L iv e s t o c k  and 6.4 7. for F i s h e r i e s . ®  The 
drought in 1987 is likely to cause a de c l i n e  in real v a l u e - a d d e d  in a g r i c u l tu re  for 
the second year running. When compa r e d  with industrial p e r f o r m a n c e  and 
m a n u f ac tu r in g exports, the d i f f e r en ce  is o v e r w h elming.
The major source of the d e cline in traditional a g r i c u l t u r e  since the early 
80's was the trend in c o m m o d i t y  prices. Table 2.5 shows the recent tre n d s  in 
average export price per ton of the 5 major agric u l t u r a l  c o mm od i t i e s ;  rice, rubber, 
maize, tapioca and sugar. The data are given for 19B0 to 1986, and for the first 9 
months of 1987. All of them showed a d e c l i n in g trend be t w e e n  1980 and 19B6. The 
average export price per ton of rice fell by around 8.127. per annum, rub b e r  fell 
3.627. per annum, maize 4.687., ta p i o c a  .94 7. and sugar 13.487. per annum b e tw e e n  1980 
and 1986, In 1987, partly due to the s h or ta ge s c r eated by the d r ought in 1986 and 
partly to increases in world demand for some c o mm o d i t i e s  such as rubber, export 
prices for all major crops except for maize increased. However, even though p ri c e s  
have picked up in 1987, it can be seen that the pri c e s  of all major c r ops except for 
tapioca are still well below the levels in 1980. T a pi o c a  is the major exc e p t i o n ,  
where the nominal average export price in baht terms is at the hi g h e s t  level e v e r . 9
8. P r e l i m i n a r y  d a t a  t a k e n  -from B a n k  o f  T h a i l a n d ,  M o n t h l y  B u l l e t i n ,  
J u n e  1 9 8 7 .
9. E x p o r t ,  v o l u m e s  f o r  t a p i o c a  a r e  h o w e v e r  d e p e n d e n t  o n  q u o t a s  f r o m  
t h e  E E C ,  t h e  m a j o r  i m p o r t e r  o f  t a p i o c a .
14
TABLE 2.5 
EXPORT PRICE PER TON FOR MAJOR CROPS 
(BAHT PER TON)
RICE RUBBER MAIZE TA P I O C A SUGAR
1980 6 , 96B 27, 145 3,314 2,853 6,586
1901 B , 697 22,962 3,243 2,625 8,557
1982 5,948 17,429 2,943 2,527 5,861
1983 5,798 21,235 3, 192 2,961 4, 124
1984 5,618 21,969 3,227 2,527 4,205
1985 5,545 19,663 2,768 2,112 3,623
1986 4,491 19,867 2,308 3,021 3,708
1 9 8 7 (9m) 4,683 22,133 2,298 3,316 4,344
GROWTH -8. 12 -3.62 -4. 68 -0.94 -13 . 4 8
(80-86)
Source: Bank of Thailand, M o nt h l y  B u l l e t i n  and " E c o n o m i
S i t u a t i o n  in First 9 months of 1987".
Note: A v erage growth 1980 - 1 9 8 6  c a l c ul at ed  by
1og regressi ons.
The p r o s p e ct s -for the major crops will depend a great deal on future price 
trends. Here the pi c t u r e  is also fairly gloomy, with most f o r e ca s t in g  a ge nc ie s such 
as the World Bank still e x pe c ti ng  no major i m p r o v e m e n t s  in price trends. 
D i ve r s i f i c a t i o n  towards c u r r en tl y  minor crops is a p o ss i b l e  answer, but s ig n i f i c a n t  
r e p l a c em en t of the 5 major crops may be difficult. D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  has been talked 
about for many years, but as we have seen, the share of the 5 major crops in the 
v a lu e - a d d e d  of all crops has been r em a r k a b l y  stable over the last 10 years or so.
L o oking at the future d e v e lo p me nt  of the Thai economy, it is clear that the 
industrial sectors, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  m a n u f a ct ur in g,  will play a leading role.
Whether Thailand can s u stain the very fast growth of m a n u f a c t u r e d  ex p o r t s  a c h i e ve d 
over the last few years r e ma i n s  to be seen, p a r t i c u l a r l y  with the present 
u n ce rt a i n t i e s  r e g a r d i n g  the world economy, but many see the recent export 
p e rf o r m a n c e  as i nd i c a t i n g  that T h a i l a n d  may being m o vi n g  along the same path as that 
taken earlier by the c u rrent Asian NIC's. However, an e xa m i n a t i o n  of the pr e s e n t  
s t r u c t ur e re v e a l s  a number of i m ba la n ce s that raise p re ss in g issues c on c e r n i n g  the 
spread of b e n e f i ts  of d e v e l o p m e n t .  There are large i m ba la nc es  b e tween the s t r u c t u r e  
of e m p l o ym en t and the s t ru ct ur e of pr o d u c t i o n ,  and b e tw ee n the locational s t r u c t u r e
of pop u l a t i o n  and of production. These lead to large income d i s p a r i t i e s ,  which 
u n fo rt u n a t e l y  have been w i d e n i n g  over the last decade, with i nd ic at io ns  of a 
w o rsening trend. These i mb a l a n c e s  are d i s c u ss ed  below.
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3. P R O D U CT IO N AND E M PL O Y M E N T  IMBALANCE
The first, i m balance that will be exami n e d  is that be t w e e n  the e m p l o y me nt  
s t r u c t u r e  and the pro d u c t i o n  structure. The c om pa ri so n b e tween Thail a n d  and South 
Korea iri the last section revealed the s im i l a r i t y  be t w e e n  Thail a n d  today and South 
Korea at around 1975. One exce p t i o n  that was pointed out was the very high share of 
emp l o y m e n t  in a g ri c u l t u r e  in Thailand compared to the share of GDP from a g r i c u l t u r e .
TABLE 3. 1
SHARES OF E M PL O Y M E N T  AND GDP AT FACTOR COST BY SEC T O R  
AND VALUE ADDED PER WORKER: 19B5
GDP EMP L O Y M E N T
V A L U E - A D D E D  
PER WORKER
(PERCENT) (BAHT/MONTH)
AG R I C U L T U R E 19. 27. 68. 47. 838
M A NU FA CT UR IN G 17.97. 8. 07. 6,696
OTHER INDUSTRIES 11.17. 2.97. 11,439
TRADES 14. 67. 9. 27. 4,752
TRANSP ?< COMMU N I C 10.27. 2. 07. 15,221
SERVICES 27. 17. 9. 57. 8,542
TOTAL 100. 07. 100. 07. 2,994
Source : GDP data from N E S D B , National Income of Thailand,
1986 edition, E mp l o y m e n t  data from NSO Labour 
Force Survey, July-Sept, 1985.
Table 3.1 shows that in 1985 68.47. are e m p l o y e d  in a g r i c u l t u r e  w hi l e  the
share of GDP at factor cost in a gr i cu lt ur e was only 19.27.. This high share of
e m p l oyment in a g ri cu lt ur e together with the low c o n t r i b u t i o n  of a gr i c u l t u r e  to GDP 
meant that v a l u e -a dd ed  per man in a gr ic ul tu re  was only 838 ba h t / m o n t h .  This is 
about 8 times less than that in m a n u f ac tu ri ng , and over 10 t i mes less than in 
"other" industries, and t r ansport and c o mm u n i c a t i o n .  It was 5.7 times less than in 
trades. This d is p a r i t y  is so striking, and it is worth r e f l e c t i n g  that the a v er a g e  
va l u e - a d d e d  per man (at current market price) in all n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  s ec to r s  was
about 8,806 baht per month, or 105,672 baht per year. If one further a s su me s that
the share of p op u l a t i o n  p r im ar il y depe n d e n t  on a g r i c u l t u r e  was about the same as the
emp l o y m e n t  s h a r e , 1" then it turns out that GDP per cap i t a  in n o n - a g r i c u l t u r e  works
out to about 52,862 baht, or about U S $ 2,049 (25.8 baht/t), i.e. c o m p ar ab le  to that
of South Korea, and about 52'/. less than ttiat in T a i w a n . 11
The d if f er en ce  be t w e e n  the share of e m p l o ym en t in a g r i c u l tu re  and the share 
of a g ri cu lt u re  in GDP in T h a i l a n d  seems to be unusual when c o m p a r e d  to other 
countries. Table 3.2 gives some a g r i cultural i n d i ca to rs  for low, middle and upper-
I
middle income Asian countries. C o lu m n s  (a) and (b) give the e mp l o y m e n t  share in
a gr ic ul tu r e for 1980 12 and the agricultural share in GDP for 1982 r e s p e c t i v e l y .  It
can be seen that apart from South Korea, Thai 1 and and the P hi l i p p i n e s  had the second 
lowest share of GDP from a g r i cu lt ur e at 2 27 . . The e m pl oy me nt  share in a g ri c u l t u r e  
for Thailand is however the third highest at 717. after B an gl ad es h and China. If we
divide the share of a g ri c u l t u r e  in GDP by the e mp lo ym en t share in a gr ic ul tu re  (the
third column), it can be seen that the ratio for T h ai la nd  is .28, which is much 
lower than the value of .42 for the second lowest count r y ,  the P h il ip p i n e s ,  and 
ex a c t l y  half the average level of .56 for all the c o u n t r i e s  in the table.
There a p pears to be two main re a s o n s  why there is such a d i f f e r e n c e  b e tween 
the ratio of employment, in a gr i c u l t u r e  and the share of a g r i c u l t u r e  in GDP in 
Thailand. The first is the past ready a va il a b i l i t y  of forest areas which could be 
c o n v e r te d to arable land. This was the main d es t i n a t i o n  for m ig ra nt s from the rural 
areas in r e s p o n s e  to the p o p u la ti on  pressure. Instead of m i g r a t in g to the urban 
areas, rural m i g r a n t s  would go to the forest areas (often i l legally), and s e ttled 
down to c u l t i v a t e  the land, and in effect took o w n e rship. As a result one found 
that up until the late 1970's, the rate of e x p a n s io n of c u l t i v a te d area in T h a i l a nd  
was b e tween 3-4 7. per annum, and was in fact greater than the rate of p o pu la ti on
10. T h i s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  bee a n  o v e r  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  p r i m a r i l y  
d e p e n d e n t  o n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  s i n c e  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  
i s  h i g h e r  d u e  t o  .less t i m e  s p e n t  at. s c h o o l  o f  r u r a l  c h i l d r e n .
11. T h e  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  T a i w a n  i s  t h e  m o r e  m e a n i n g f u l  o n e  s i n c e  it. 
h a s  a v e r y  l o w  s h a r e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  G D P ,  w h i l e  t h e  s h a r e  o f  
a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  G D P  i n  S o u t h  K o r e a  w a s  s t i l l  147. i n  1 9 8 5 .
12. T h e  m o s t  r e c e n t  y e a r  f o r  w h i c h  d a t a  a r e  a v a i l a b l e .
growth in the rural areas. The land/man ratio in a g r i c u l t u r e  had a c t u a l ly  been 
increasing up until the late 1 9 / 0 ’ 5.
TABLE 3.2 
A G R I C U LT U RA L INDICATORS 
(SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES)
(a) (b)
PERCENT ABRIC
L A B . F O R C E SHARE
IN AGRIC IN GDP RATIO
COUNTRY ( 19B0) (1982) (b/a)
B A N G LADESH 75 47 . 63
BURMA 53 4 B . 90
CHINA 74 37 .50
INDIA 70 33 . 47
INDONESIA 57 26 . 46
K O REA,REP 36 16 .44
MALAYSIA 23 23 1. 00
PAKISTAN 55 31 . 56
P H IL I P P I N E S 52 22 . 42
SRI LANKA 53 27 .51
THAILAND 71 22 . 28
Source: IBRD World D ev el o p m e n t  Report, v ar io u s  issues.
A second reason is the very high p r op o r t i o n  of farm h o u s e h o l d s  who are owner
c u lt iv at or s in Thailand. In 1981, data from the s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  survey give the
p r op o r t i o n  as 83.37. of all farm h o u s e h o l d s . 13 This is likely to be a factor w o rk in g 
against large scale m i gration into the urban areas. It is likely that the market 
for the sales and p u r c h a s e s  of land in the rural areas is thin, and thus owner 
c u l t i v at or s who wish to sell their land and migrate to the urban areas may only get
rather low prices for their land. This would increase the o p p o r t u n i t y  cost of
migration. Migr a t i o n  from s e lf -c ul t i v a t i n g  h o us eh ol ds  would t h e r e f o r e  be l i mi t e d  to 
a few family members such as sons or daughters, and may be c i r c u l a t o r y  in n a ture, 
rather than a w h o l e s a l e  movement of all the family members.
13. N S O ,  S o c i o - e c o n o m i c  S u r v e y  1 9 8 1 .
I
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Another -factor often ment i o n e d  as an e x p l a n a ti on  for the very high share of 
e m p l oyment in a g r i c u lt u re  in Thailand is the w i d e sp re ad  r el ia nc e on n on -a gr ic ul tu ra l 
work to s u p p lement farm income t h rough out the year, and p a rt i c u l a r l y  during the dry 
season. Thus, while a person may be c l a s s if ie d as an agric u l t u r a l  worker, the 
p ro p o r t i o n  of time that he or she spends on n o n - a g r ic ul tu ra l work, may be 
substantial. This is however p r e s um ab ly  also the case in other c o u n tries, and data 
are not readily a v a i l a b l e  for a comparison. Also a v a i l a b i l i t y  of n o n- ag ri cu lt ur al  
work may be sever e l y  limited in some parts of the country, as e vi d e n c e d  by the very 
large seasonal u n e mp lo y me nt  p ro bl e m  in T h a i l a n d . 14
The above i m balance between the e mp l o y m e n t  and p r o d uc ti on  s tr uc tu re  s u g g e s t s  
large income d i s p a r i ti e s between a g r i cu lt ur e and n o n- ag ri c u l t u r e .  For 1985, even 
assuming that all v a lu e -a dd ed  in a g r i cu lt ur e goes to the agric u l t u r a l  h ou se h o l d s ,  
and that, those in a g r i c u l tu r e obtain additional income from work in n o n - a g r i c u l t u r e  
and t r ansfers equal to 75'/. of what they earn in a gr ic u l t u r e ,  it is still the case 
that the average e a rning would be below what they would earn if they worked at the 
59 baht per day m i nimum wage level p r e v a i li ng  in 1985 (for most municipal areas).
Other data s o urces also c on fi r m  the e x i s t en ce  of large income d i s p a r i t i e s  
b e tween a g r i c u lt ur e and n o n - ag r ic ul tu re . Data from the 1981 S o c i o - e c o n o m i c  Survey 
give a d i f f e re nc e in per capita h o u s e ho ld  income b e tw e e n  agric u l t u r a l  and non- 
a g r i cultural h o u s e h o ld s at about 1:2.3, and wage data from the Labour Force S ur ve y s  
also give a wage d i f f erential in favour of n o n - a q r i c u l t u r e  at around 2. 1 s What is 
worse is that the major data s o urces are c o ns is te nt  in showing that the income 
d is pa ri ty  between a g ri c u l t u r e  and n o n - a g r i c u l t u r e  has been w i d e n i ng  over the last 
decade. This comes t h rough whether we look at the trend in v a lu e - a d d e d  per worker, 
the trend in wages, or data from the S o c i o - e c o n o m i c  Surveys. One good sign is that 
while the d is p a r i t y  of i n comes had worse n e d  the i n c i d en ce  of p o ve r t y  a p p e a r e d  to 
have been reduced (at least b e tween 1975/6 and 1981). 1A
14. S e e  S u s s a n g k a r r t  ( 1 9 8 7 ) .
15. S e e  T D R I  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  a l s o  J i t s u c h o n  ( 1 9 8 7 ) .
16. S e e  T D R I  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  s e c t i o n  2 . 3 . 1 ,  a n d  K r o n g k a e w  ( 1 9 8 7 ) .
Wit It the expected poor price outlook -for the major crops, the tendency is 
for the income d i s p a ri ty  between a g r i cu lt ur e and n o n - a g r i c u l t u r e  to c o n t i nu e to get 
worse unless there is a major shift of emp l o y m e n t  out off a g r i culture. It is 
u n li k e l y  that a g ri cu lt ur e can c o n t i nu e to support a share of e m pl o y m e n t  anywhere 
near the current level in the future. In a recent d et ai le d study of the main crops 
using a non - l i n e a r  p ro gr am m in g model of the agric u l t u r a l  s e c t o r , 17 it was found that 
if real wages in a gr ic ul tu r e were td remain u nc h a n g e d  during the period of the Sixth 
Five Year Plan (1987-1991), then the demand for labour in a gr i c u l t u r e  during the 
peak agricultural season would only increase by around 0.5'/. per annum, and this is 
far less than the expec t e d  increase in labour supply in the rural areas of around 
2.4 7. per annum, assuming m ig r a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  similar' to the past trend. It was 
c o n c l u de d that three things are likely to h ap pe n: - (i) a fall in real a g r i c u l t u r a l  
wages and incomes, (ii) an incre a s e  in u n d e r - e m p l o y m e n t  in a g ri cu l t u r e ,  and (iii) an 
a c ce le ra te d shift of e m p l o ym en t out off a g r i c u l tu re  much faster than had h a p p e n e d  in 
the past.
Of the three a d j u s t me nt s above, the latter would seem the most p r e f e r ab le , 
as it would be a move in a d i r e c t io n to c o rrect the i mb a l a n c e  be t w e e n  the e mp lo ym en t 
and p r o d u c ti on  s tr uc tu re  that was d i s c u ss ed  above. F u rther push in this d ir ec ti on  
also comes from the fact that new land for expa n s i o n  of the c ul t i v a t e d  area is now 
no longer abundant, and since the late 1 9 7 0 ’s the c ul t i v a t e d  area has only been 
e x p a n d i n g  at around 17. per annum. There are however major pol i c y  issues that have 
to be resol v e d  r eg ar di ng  the locational as p e c t s  of p o p u l a t i o n  and e m p l o ym en t for the 
future. This has to do with the current regional imbalance, and is d i s c u s se d in the 
next section.
17. F’o  n q t a  n a  k o  r n , B u s s  a n g k a  r n , K  a  t i I a r n a  n ci C  h  a 1 a  m  w  o  n q ( 1 9 8 7 )  .
4. R E G I O N A L  I M B A L A N C E 1®
Apart from the i m b a l a nc e b e tween the emp l o y m e n t  and p r o d u ct io n structure, 
another equally significant, i m ba la nc e exits c o n c e r ni ng  the locational a s pects of 
p op ul a ti on  and e mp lo y m e n t ,  and that of industries. This imba l a n c e  leads to a great 
deal of d i s p a r i t i e s  in incomes by region. The pr o b l e m  is of course not indepe n d e n t  
of the d is pa ri ty  be t w e e n  se c t o r s  of produc t i o n ,  and is partly the c o m b i n a ti on  of the 
sectoral d i s pa ri ty  and the location of i n du s t r i e s  across regions. Here one also 
finds some ex t r e m e  d i f f e r e n c e s  which is worth high l i g h t i n g .
Table 4.1 shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of GDP (at current market price) by sector 
and reg i o n  for 1985. 19 Also given are the p o p u l a ti on  d is tr ib ut io n,  and GDP per 
capita. The d if f e r e n c e  b e tween the Greater Bangkok area and the rest is stark. (The 
G r eater Bangkok, area i n c l u d e s  B a n g k o k-  Thonburi and the 5 s u rr ou nd in g p r ov in ce s of 
Gamut Prakan, Samut Sakhon, Nakhon Pathom, Nonthaburi and Path urn T h a n i ) . 2 ® Per 
capita GDP in the Gr e a t e r  Bangkok area was 5 8 , 9 6 3 . 2  baht in 1985. This was over 
$2,150 at the 27.2 b ah t / d o l l a r  e x c h a n ge  rate in 1985. While the Greater Bangkok 
area c o nt ai n ed  15.567. of the total po p u l a t i o n ,  it a c c o un te d for 45.547. of GDP. Per 
capita GDP in the G re at e r  B a ngkok area was over 4 times that in all the other 
re g i o n s  except for the Central Region, where it was 2.75 times higher; it was 7.29 
times higher than in the Northeast. Taken in isolation, it can be said that the 
G r eater Bangkok area is c e r t a i n l y  of NIC status, and has been for some t i m e . 21
18. T h  i s  sec: t i. o n  i s  m o s t  1 y f r o m  sec:t: 1 o n  2 . 3 . 2  i n  T D R I  ( 1 9 8 7 )  .
19. R e g i o n a l  G D P  a t  c u r r e n t  f a c t o r  c o s t s  a r e  n o t  p u b l i s h e d  b y  t h e
N E S D B .
2 0 .  If o n e  j u s t  l o o k s  a t  t h e  B a n g k o k — T h o n b u r i  a r e a  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  
t h e  r e s t ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  w o u l d  o b v i o u s l y  b e  m o r e  e x t r e m e .  H o w e v e r ,  
f o  r p r o  b  1 e  m  s  r e  g a  r d i n g 1 o  c: a  t i o n  o  f i n d u  s  t r i e s ,  i t i s  m  o  r e  u  s  e  f u  1 t o  
l o o k  a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  B a n g k o k  a r e a  a s  m a n y  i n d u s t r i e s  a r e  n o w  b e i n g
1 o  c: a t e  d i n  t h e  5  s  u  r r o  u  n d i n g f :> r o  v  i n c: e  s .
2 1 .  B e c a u s e  G D P  a t  c u r r e n t  m a r k e t  p r i c e  c o n t a i n s  net. i n d i r e c t  t a x e s ,  
a n d  m u c h  o f  i t  o r i g i n a t e  i n  B a n g k o k ,  i t  w i l l  o v e r - s t a t e  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  b e t w e e n  t h e  G r e a t e r  B a n g k o k  a r e a  a n d  t h e  r e s t .  H o w e v e r ,  
e v e n  if w e  s u b t r a c t  a l l  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  f o r  t h e  K i n g d o m  f r o m  t h e  G D P  o f  
just, t h e  G r e a t e r  B a n g k o k  a r e a ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  a r e  s t i l l  v e r y  l a r g e .
In t h i s  c a s e ,  p e r  c a p i t a  G D P  i n  t h e  G r e a t e r  B a n g k o k  a r e a  c a m e  t o
TABLE 4.1
GROSS D O M E S T IC  PR O D U C T  (AT C U RRENT MARKET PRICE) BY REGION
(1985, MI L L I O N  BAHT)
KI N G D O M N-EAST NORTH SOUTH C E NTRAL
\\1
BA N G K O K
A G R I C U LT UR E
INDUSTRY
SERVI C E S
178533
316697
546124
41721 
2061 1
83365
42302
24295
68799
3 3 462
15367
49126
50221
54693
83209
10827
201730
261625
TOTAL GDP 1041354 145697 135395 97955 188123 474182
P E RC AP IT A GDP 20148 8083 13304 1 4737 21395 58963
P O P U LA TI ON  (MIL) 51. 68 IB. 02 10.18 6. 65 8. 79 8. 04
ROW SHARES (PERCENT)
KI N G D O M N-EAST NORTH SOUTH C E NTRAL B A NGKOK
A G R I CU LT UR E
INDUSTRY
S E R V I C E S
100.00 
100.00 
100.00
23.37 
6.51 
15. 26
23.69 
7. 67 
12.60
IB. 74 
4. 85 
9. 00
28. 13 
17. 27 
15.24
6.06 
63. 70 
47.91
TOTAL GDP 100.00 13.99 13. 00 9.41 18.07 45.54
P O P U LA TI ON 100.00 34. 88 19. 69 12. B6 17.01 15.56
COL U M N  SHARES (PERCENT)
K I NGDOM N-EAST NORTH S O UTH CE N T R A L B A NG KO K
A G RI CU LT UR E
INDUSTRY
S E R V I C ES
17.14 
30. 41 
52.44
28. 64 
14.15 
57.22
31 .24 
17. 94 
50. 81
34. 16 
15. 69 
50. 15
26.70
29.07
44.23
2. 28 
42.54 
55. 17
TOTAL GDP 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: NESDB, GDP by Province, 1985
//I B a ngkok here inclu d e s  the Ba n g k o k  M e t r o p o l i t a n  Area and
the 5 s u rr ou nd in g p r o v i n ce s
4 5 , 3 6 ( 3  b a h t  i n  1 9 8 5 .  This; w i l l  s t i l  1 b e  o v e r  3  t i m e s  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h a t  
■for a n y  o t h e r  r e g i o n  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  C e n t r a l  r e g i o n ,  w h e r e  i t  w i l l  b e
2. 1 t i m e s  h i g h e r .
The N o r t h e as t lagged far behind the other regions. It c on t a i n e d  3 4 . 8 B 7. of 
the total p o pu la ti on  w h ile its share in GDP was only 13.997.. Per capita GDP for the 
Nort h e a s t  was 64.67. less than for the North, 82.37. less than the South, 1 64.77. less
than the Central, and 629.57. less than for Greater Bangkok.
Of the other r eg i on s apart from the Greater Bangkok area, the Central region
had the highest per c ap i t a  GDP at 21,394.7 baht. Next came the South at 14,736.8
baht, and then the North at 13,304.1 baht.
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of GDP by sector across the va r i o u s  r e gi on s is also 
i l luminating. Of course, the share of a gr i c u l t u r e  in the G r eater Bangkok area is 
very small. For the other regions, the share of a g r i c u l t u r a l  GDP was h i gh e s t  in the 
Central region at 28.137.. The North and the N o r t h e as t had very similar shares of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  GDP at around 23.57., while the South had 18.747.. For serv i c e s ,  it can 
be seen that the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of GDP across region is very similar to the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of total GDP across region. This meant that the share of GDP from 
s e r v i ce s within each r eg i o n  was rather similar. This is borne out by l o oking the 
column shares, where it can be seen that the share of GDP from s e r v i c e s  was around 
507. in all the regions, a l t h o u gh  the Greater Bangkok area and the N o rt he as t had a 
little more than 557., and the Central region a little less than 457..
For i n dustries, almost two thirds of total GDP o r i g in at e from the G r eater
Ba n g k o k  area (63,77.). Given the large d i f f er en ce  b et we e n  the v a l u e - a dd ed  per worker 
b e tween i n d u s tr i es  and a g r i c u lt ur e,  the c o n c e n t r a t i o n  of i n du st ri es  around the 
G r eater B a ngkok area is an i m portant source of the d i f f e r e n c e  in per capita GDP 
be t w e e n  Greater Ba n g k o k  and the other regions. Also the i n d u s t r ie s and s e r v i c es  
around the capital region tend to be more capital i nt en si ve  than e l s e where, and this 
would a c c e n t u a te  the d i f f e r e n c e  in GDP per capita. In the other regions, the 
Central region had the largest share of GDP from in d u s t r i e s ,  17.277.; the other
r eg io n s  all had a share of less than 87..
Data from the 19B 1 B o c i o - ec on om i : Sur v e y  c on fi r m s  the large per cap i t a  
h ou se ho ld  income d i f f e r e n c e s  be t w e e n  regions. A ve ra g e  h ou se ho ld  income per head in 
the G r eater B an gk o k  region was about 21,500 baht per year. This was about twice the
national a v erage of 1B ,974 baht. The per capita h ou se ho ld  income in the Greater 
Bangkok area was over three times that in the Nor t h e a s t ,  about twice that in the* 
North and South, and about 807. higher than in the Central reqion.
As with income d i s p ar it y by sectors of p r od u c t i o n ,  all major data sources 
co n f i r m  that the d i s p a r i ty  of incomes by r e gi o n s  haci worsen during the past ten 
years or so. Table 4.2 shows the index of real per capita GDP for the va r i o u s  
re g i o n s  from 1975 to 1985. Also shown are the av e r a g e  rates of growth per annum for 
the whole period, and for the s ub -p er io ds  1975-00 and 1980-85. Whether one looks at 
the whole period from 1975-1985, or at the two s u b- pe r i o d s ,  it turns out that real 
GDP per capita in the Gr e a t e r  Bangkok area showed the fastest a v erage rate of growth 
among all of the regions.
TABLE 4.2 
INDEX OF REAL PER C AP I T A  GDP BY REGION 
(1975=100)
INDEX OF REAL PER C A PI TA  GDP
K IN GD OM N O RTH N-EAST CE N T R A L SOUTH G T .B K K
1975 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
1976 105. 6 104. 6 98. 9 109. 7 105. 2 107. 5
1977 109. 7 101 . 5 94.0 113.2 113.9 115.4
1978 117.0 110.2 104.3 117.7 118.0 122. 4
1979 120. 4 113. 1 107. 4 115.0 120. 1 130. 2
1980 121.2 114.3 111.1 115.8 115.7 132. 4
1981 120. 6 117.9 103. 6 124.7 109. 6 129. 8
1982 121.0 114.9 107. 3 125. 3 105.0 130.2
1983 124. 9 119.4 114.8 121. 7 114.3 132.7
1984 129. 9 122. 0 113. 1 128. 7 110.0 141.4
1985 131.0 125. 4 113.3 127. 9 107. 6 144.2
GRO W T H  75-80 4. 06 2.02 2.51 2. 62 3.31 5. 82
GRO W T H  80-85 1. 84 1.72 1. 22 1.61 -0.75 2.00
GRO W T H  75-85 2. 40 2. 14 1. 62 2. 09 0. 20 3. 15
Source: GDP per cap i t a  from NESDB, Gross Provincial Product, 
1975-85,
C o n s u m e r  price index from 1977-B5 from Bank of Thailand, 
M on th l y  B u lletin: extend to 1975 using GDP d e f l at or s from 
Gross P r o v incial Product.
Note: Growth rates are trend growth r a tes c om pu te d by log
regressi o n s .
While the 19B5/6 S o c i o - e c o n o m i c  Survey is not yet p u b l i c l y  available, Medhi 
k r o n g k a e w ( 1 9 8 7 ) showed that regional income d i s p a r i ti es  has worsen b e tween the 
197 j/6 and the 19B1 S o c i o - e c o n o m i c  Surveys. Table 4.3, r e p r o du ce d from his study, 
shows the index of per capital h o u s e h ol d income by region r e l a t iv e to the mean for 
the kingdom. It can be seen that whereas in 1975/6 the per capita h ou se ho ld  income 
in the Greater Bangkok area was 82.27. higher than the national average, in 1981 this 
had i n creased to 95.9 7. higher. Apart from the Greater Bangkok area, only two other 
s ub -r eg io n s showed an i m pr o ve me nt  in their r e l a t i ve  income position; the Lower North 
and the Lower South. All other re g i o n s  s u f f e r e d  a decline, and this was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  sev e r e  for the Lower Northeast, the C e n t r a l - M i d d l e  and C en tr a l - W e s t  
regions, whose indices all fell by more than 10 p e r c e n t . 22
TABLE 4.3 
S U B R E G I O N A L  INCOME D I S P AR IT IE S 
(1975/6 AND 1981)
S U B R EG IO N 1975/6 1981
INDEX OF R E L A T I V E INDEX OF R E L A T I V E
PER CAPITA PER CAPITA
H OU SE HO LD INCOME H O U S E HO LD INCOME
UPPER NORTH 76. 9 75. 5
L O WER NORTH 91 . 8 104. 2
UPPER N O R T HE A ST 69. 2 64.0
LOWER N O RT HE AS T 69. 6 62. 4
C EN T R A L  WEST 125. 2 110.7
C EN T RA L MIDDLE 131. 5 117.2
C EN T RA L EAST 100. 9 96. 1
U P PER SOUTH 100. 0 95. 4
LOWER SOUTH
CD 91. 9
G R EA TE R BA N G K O K 182. 2 195. 9
WHOLE K IN G D O M 100. 0 100. 0
Source: Table 5 in K r o n gk ae w (1987).
Data from NSO, S o c i o - e c o n o m i c  Surveys, 
1975/6 and 1901.
2 2 .  D a t a  o n  w a g e s  a l s o  s h o w  t h a t  o v e r  t h e  last. 1 0  y e a r s  o r  s o  r e a l  
w a g e s  i n  B a n g k o k  h a d  b e e n  i n c r e a s i n g  f a s t e r  t h a n  t h a t  t o r  a l l  t h e  
o t h e r  r e g i o n s .  B e e  T D R I  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  t a b l e  2 . 1 9 .
Looking more c lo s e l y  at the trend in real per capita GDP in table 4.2 
r e veals that while income d i s p a ri ty  between the Greater Bangkok area and the rest 
had worsen, all re g i o n s  showed i n creases in real per capita GDP between 1975 and 
1905. The N o r t h e a s t  r e g i st e re d a trend oT 1.627. per annum growth, the North 2.14 7., 
and the Central region 1.617. per annum. The case of the South is odd. Even though 
p op ul at i on  growth rates in the South is still rather high, this in itself is 
u nl ik el y  to e x plain the fall in real per capita GDP that o c c u r r e d  between 1980 and 
1985, and which led to only a small trend growth in real per cap i t a  GDP between 1975 
and 1985. The e x p l a n a t i o n  p r o b a bl y lies with the very high pri c e s  for rubber around 
1980-81 (See table 2.5).
During the second period from 1980 to 1985, real per cap i t a  GDP growth 
slowed down for the c ou nt ry  as a whole, with an a v erage growth of 1.847. c o m p a r ed  to 
a rate of 4.067. achie v e d  be t w e e n  1975 and 1980. This was b ec au s e  the d e c l i ni ng  
trends in c o m m od it y prices, the world r e c e ssion, and the somew h a t  o v e r - v a lu ed  
e x c h a ng e rate up until the end of 1984, led to a period of r e la t i v e  low growth in 
Thailand. However, a good sign was that the d i f f e r e n t i a l  in the rates of growth of 
real per capita GDP b e tw e e n  Greater Bangkok and the other r eg io n s  was less in the 
period 1980-85 c o m p a r e d  to b e tween 1975 and 1980. In the ea r l i e r  period, the rate 
of real per capita GDP growth in the Greater Bangkok area was over twice as high as 
those in all the other r e gi o n s  except for the South. In the latter period, the 
growth rate d i f f e r e n t i a l  be t w e e n  Greater Bangkok and the North, N or t h e a s t  and the 
Central areas had n a rr o we d cons i d e r a b l y .
While the rate of w i d e n i n g  in income d i f f e r e n t i a l  be t w e e n  the G r eater 
B a ngkok area and the rest of the K i ng d o m  appea r e d  to have slowed down in the first 
half of the 1980's, the recent rapid growth of the m a n u f a c t u r i n g  sector due to very 
good export p e rf or ma nc e,  and the poor agric u l t u r a l  growth p e r f o r m a n c e  and pro s p e c t s ,  
is likely to lead to another period of rapid w i d e n i n g  of the d i f f e r e n t i a l .  The 
reason is simple. If one looks at the location of the major m a n u f a c t u r e d  export 
sectors, these are p r e d o m i n a n t l y  located in the G r eater Bangkok area. The regional 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  is even more e xt re m e  than that for all i n d u s tr ie s as a group, of which
63.77. are located around the capital area. For example, in 1984, over 907. of the 
v a lu e - a d d e d  from the t ex t il e i n d u s t r y  was from the Gr e a t e r  Bangkok area, this was
2 7
also the case -for Garment, Leather Products, Furniture, I n t e grated C i r c u it s and 
Electrical Goods, and Toys and S p o r t i n g  Goods. For Jewelry, it was around 82'/.. 2 31
For the Future, major policy ch o i c e s  have to he made. From the last section 
it was seen that the current imba l a n c e  b e tween the e m p l o y me nt  and p ro d u c t i o n  
s t r u c tu re  is likely to lead to an a cc el er at ed  shift of e m pl o y m e n t  out off 
agriculture. In this section, we saw that the locational d i st r i b u t i o n  of the 
m an uf a c t u r i n g  sector is highly c o nc e n t r a t e d  around the capital area, and this is the 
sector that should be the main source of growth for the future. The c o n c l us io n 
would seem to be that one can expect a rapid increase in the flow of p o p u la ti on  and 
e mp l o y m e n t  into the Greater Bangkok area w i thout major policy i n i t i at iv es  from the 
govern ment.
F r  o m  N E : S D B  , R e g i o n a  1 G D P  d at:a t. ape? -f o r  1 9 8 4 .
5. E D U C A T I O N A L  I M BALANCE AND THE LABOUR MARKET
The i m po rt an ce  of education, both for the individual and for economic 
devel o p m e n t ,  has long been recognized. E d u c a t io n is an important part of "human 
capital". Apart from its n o n - p e c u n i a r y  benefits, the economic returns to educ a t i o n  
is an important i n c e n t iv e  d e t e r m i ni ng  the demand for education. Thus, there is a 
close link between the labour market structure, which d e t e r m i ne s the econo m i c  
r ew ar d s  from e d u c ation, and the o b s e r v e d  e d ucational pattern.
TABLE 5.1
GROSS E N R O L L M E N T  RAT I O S  FOR S E L E C TE D ASIAN C O U N TR IE S
(1904)
LEV E L S  OF E D U C A TI ON
P R IMARY S E C O N D AR Y TERTI A R Y
THAIL A N D 97. 07. 30. 07. 22. 57.
SOUTH KOREA 96. 07. 9 4 . 07. 26. 17.
TAIWAN 1 00. 07. 91 . 07. 12. 57.
S IN G A P O R E 1 15. 07. 71 . 07. 1 1. 87.
HONG KONG 105. 07. 69. 07. 12. 87.
I N DONESIA 1 IB. 07. 39. 07. 6. 57.
M A L A Y SI A 99.07. 53. 07. 6.17.
P H I L I P P I N E S 1 07. 07. 68. 07. 29. 17.
Source: IBRD World D e v e lo pm en t Report, 1987.
The pa t t e r n  of ed u c a t i o n a l  e n r o ll me nt  in T h ai la nd  seems rather odd when 
c o m p a r e d  to other Asian countries. Table 5.1 shows the gross e n r o l l me nt  ratio at 
the primary, sec o n d a r y ,  and t e r t i a r y  levels for s e l e c te d Asian countries. While 
pr i m a r y  e n r o l lm en t is almost universal for most c ou n t r i e s ,  for Thail a n d  there is a 
s t r i k i n g  contrast be t w e e n  the s ec on da ry  and t e r t i a r y  e n r o ll me nt  ratios c o mp ar ed  to 
other countries. At the s e c o n d a ry  level, T h a i l a n d  lags far behind the Asian N I C's 
and some other ASEAN countries. The gross s ec o n d a r y  e n r o l l m en t ratio in Thail a n d  
was around 30'/. in 1984. This c o m p a r ed  with 94'/. in South Korea, 917. in Taiwan, 717. 
in Sin g a p o r e ,  537. in M al ay si a and 687. in the P h i l i p p i n e s .  On the other hand, at the 
t e r t i ar y level, the e nr ol lm en t rat i o s  in T h a i l a n d  c om pa r e d  well with the other 
cou n t r i e s ,  with a gross e nr o l l m e n t  ratio at the t er ti a r y  level of 22.57. in 1984
compa r e d  to 26.1'/. in South Korea, 12.57. in Taiwan, 11.87. in Singapore, 6.17. in 
M a l a y s ia  and 29.17. in the Phili p p i n e s .
To u n d e r s t an d the Thai educat i o n a l  pattern, it is n ec e s s a r y  to e x amine the 
s i t u a t i o n  in the labour market. The first important fact is that most of the better 
educated w o rkers are e m p l o y e d  by the public sector. Table 5.2 shows the imp o r t a n c e  
of the public sector for the e m p l o y me nt  of the better educated. For those with 
e l em e n ta ry  e du ca ti on  and below, only around 27 are e m p l o y e d  in the public sector.
The r a tio r a pi dl y i n c r ea se s to 227. for those with s e co n da ry  education. For 
vocational e d u c a t i o n ,  417. are e m p l o y e d  by the govern m e n t ,  for u n iv er si ty  e du c a t i o n
567., and for teacher t r ai n in g 8 4 7..
TABLE 5.2
SHARE OF G O V E R N M E N T  E MP L O Y M E N T  BY LEVELS OF E DU CA TI ON
G OV ER NM EN T
E MP L O Y M E N T
TOTAL SHARE
G O V E R NM EN T
E LE M E N T A R Y  AND BELOW 
S E C O N DA RY  
V OC AT IO NA L 
TE A C H E R  T R A I N IN G 
U N I V E R S IT Y
441058
320901
229319
440623
244674
2 3 0 3 6 44 0
1448770
554 5 6 2
5 24 7 5 0
434412
1.917. 
22. 157. 
41 . 357. 
83. 977. 
56. 327.
TOTAL 1676575 25998934 6. 457.
Source: NSO Labour Force Survey, J u ly -S e p t e m b e r  1984.
In the public sector, the pay scale is c l osely tied to the educational 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  of the workers, with the result that there are clear incr e a s e s  in pay 
with education. This is the normal pattern that one would expect from various 
r eg r e s s i o n s  m e a s u r i n g  i n c r e as es  in e a rn in gs  with e d uc at io n that have been carried 
out in many countr ies.24
For p ri va t e  e m p l o y e e s  the s i t u a ti on  is not so clear. It is now common 
p r a c t ic e to view labour m ar ke t s  iri LDC's as c o ns is ti ng  of two broad segments, the
2 4 .  F o r  T h  a  i. 1 a n  d b e e  BI a u g  ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,  a n  d mt:>r ©  r e c  e n  1 1 y  P r  i e b  j r i. v a t  
( 1 9 8 4 )  a n  d B 1 o  c  k , C  h  u  t i. k u  1 a  n d P  a  a p o  n g B  a  k a  r n  ( 1 9 8 6 )  .
"•formal" and the "informal" sectors. The formal part is t h e o re ti ca ll y c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
by wages that do not clear the market and b a r r i e r s  to entry, while the informal 
market is viewed as close to the stand a r d  t e xt-book model with market clearing 
wanes, so that in effect the informal sector acts as the absor b e r  of last resort.
The main pr o b l e m  in a n a l y z in g  the r e turns to educ a t i o n  in such a context is that 
with s eg m e n t a t i o n ,  and r a t i o ni n g of formal sector jobs, the s t a n d a r d  human capital 
r e g r e s si on s can lead to rather biased e st i m a t e s  even if dummy v ar ia bl es  are put into 
the r e g r es si on s to ca p t u r e  d i f f e re nt  segments of the market. The d i ff ic ul ty  is that 
there can be " s e l e ct iv i ty " problems, if for example u no bs er ve d ability a t t r i b u t e s  
i n fluence the p r ob a b i l i t y  that an individual can get into the formal sector, and 
also affect the pay that the individual g e t s . 23
In a recent study of the Thai labour market using data from the J u 1v~ 
September I 7 B 4 Labour Force Survey, which included s p e c i a l l y  d e s i g ne d additional 
q u es ti on s to yield i nf or ma t io n on the place of e m p l o y me nt  (Sussanqkarn (19B 7)>, 
wages of p r ivate and g o v e r n me nt  e m p l o ye es  in the urban areas were analyzed 
c o n t ro ll in g for p o s s i b le  s e le c t i v i t y  biases arising from labour market s e g m e n ta ti on . 
The study showed that there are high rewards to e du ca ti on  in the "formal" part of 
the labour market (the G o ve rn me nt  sector and the larger p r ivate firms), but very 
little r e wards to e d uc at i on  above the pr i m a r y  level in the "in f o r m a l "  sector. In 
fact., none of the e d u c a ti on  v a r i a b le s were s ig ni f i c a n t  at the 107. level in the wage 
e q u a t i o n  of the informal sector, while all of these v a r i a b l es  were highly 
s i g n i f ic an t in the formal sector wage equation.
25. For ex te?nisi ve di isc:ussi. ons of se lecti vi t.y prob 1. ems and bi ases i n 
e  is t :i. in a t i o  n s  s  e  e  11 a  d d a 1 a  ( 1 9 8 3 )  .
TABLE 5.3 
P R E D I C TE D  PRIVATE WABES IN B A NGKOK 
MALE, FEMALE -- FORMAL, INFORMAL 
35 YEARS OLD, 10 YEARS EX P E R I E N C E ,  N O N- MI GR AN T
(BAHT PER MONTH)
MALE FEMALE
FORMAL INFORMAL FORMAL INFORMAL
< PRIMARY 2,051 2,032 1,706 1 ,298
PRIMARY 2,579 2,032 2,146 1 ,298
SECO N D A R Y 3,915 2,032 3,258 1 ,298
V O CA T I O N A L 5,264 2,032 4,380 1 ,298
TEACH 4,367 2,032 3,633 1 ,298
UNI V E R S I T Y 8,285 2,032 6,894 1 ,298
Source: S u s s an gk ar n (1987), tables 3.13 and 3.14.
Table 5.3 gives a sample of the p re d i c t e d  wages for p ri va te  e m p l o y e e s  in 
Bangkok from the estimates, where thd i ns ig ni fi ca nt  e d u c a ti on al  c o e f f i c i e n t s  in the 
informal wage equation were taken to be zero. The pa t t e r n  shows very large r e wa rd s 
to educ a t i o n  in the formal s e ctors for both males and females. Given the zero 
educational return in the informal sector, the wage d if fe re nt ia l b e tw e e n  the formal 
and the informal sector r a pidly rises with the level of edu c a t i o n .  For males, the 
pay for those with less than p ri ma r y  e d u c a ti on  are almost the same in the formal and 
informal sector. The d if fe r e n t i a l  rises to 277. for those with c o mp l et ed  p ri ma r y
I
education, 937. for s ec on da ry  e d u c ation, and 3087. for those with u n i v e r s i t y  
education. For females there are g e ne ra ll y higher d i f f e r e n t i a l s  be t w e e n  the formal 
and informal sectors. Even for those with less than p r im a r y  e du c a t i o n ,  the 
differential was 317., and this rises to 4317. for those with u n i v e r s i t y  edu c a t i o n .
One finds greater m a l e -f em al e wage d i f f e r e n t i a l  in the informal sector, and this may 
reflect the p r e d o m i n a n c e  of more p h y s i c a ll y d e m a n di ng  jobs in this sector to w h ich 
f e males are more of a d i s a d v an ta ge . It may also simply re f l e c t  greater 
d i s c ri mi na ti on  against fe m a l e s  in the r e l a t i v e l y  u n c o n t r o l l e d  informal market.
While the above has indi c a t e d  that e d u c a t io n ap p e a r s  to yield high r e wa r d s  
in the formal part of the labour market and very little in the informal sector, the 
analy s e s  were confi n e d  to e m p l oy ee s (private and public) where wages and other data
on the place of e m pl o y m e n t  were a v a i l a b l e . 26 However, most w o rk e r s  in T ha il an d are 
not employees. In 1984, only 6.47. of all wo r k e r s  were public e mp lo ye es  and 18.37. 
were private employees. By far the vast m a j o r it y of wo r k e r s  are o w n - a c c o u n t  and 
unpaid family w o rkers (including most of those in a gr ic ul t u r e ) .
The d i fficult in a n a l y z i n g  the impact of e d u c at io n on the e ar ni n g s  of self- 
employed workers is that most h ou s e h o l d  su r v e y s  do not have a d e q u a t e  i n fo r m a t i o n  on 
the value of other p r o d uc ti ve  assets such as capital, and s e l f - e m p l o y e d  income are 
partly the returns to these other assets, also there are u s ua ll y no i nf o r m a t i o n  on 
costs of production. F o rt u n a t e l y  some very careful work have been done to a na ly ze  
the impact of educ a t i o n  on farm p r o d u c t i v i t y  in Thailand; see Ja m i s o n  and Lau 
(1982). While the a n a l y se s were not based on a n a t i o n - w i d e  sam p l e  and were limited 
to farm h ou s e h o l d s  around the Chiangmai area, the f in di n g s  were very i n t e r e st in g,  
and together with the above f i n d i n g s  for e m pl oy ee s yield a c o n s i s t e n t  p i c t u r e  for 
the u n d e r st an di ng  of payoff to e d u c a t i o n  and e n r o l l me nt  p at te r n s  in T h ailand.
After p e r f o rm in g many m u l t i p i e , r e g r e s s i o n s  on almost all c o m b i n a t i o n s  of the 
variables, the main fi n d i n g  of J a mison and Lau was that having 4 years of c o m p l e t e d  
primary e d ucation g e n e r a l ly  had a s ig ni fi ca nt  impact on farm p r o d u c t i v i t y .  This was 
true of both those using r e l a ti ve ly  modern farm t e c h n o l o g i e s  ("chemical f a r m s " ) ,  and 
those using more tr a d i t i o n a l  t e c h n o l o g i e s  ("non-chemical farms"). The s i t u a t i o n  for 
education above the p ri ma ry  level is different. There are some e v i d e n c e s  for 
s i gnificant p ro du c ti ve  e f fe c t s  of more than 4 years of p r im ar y e d u c a t i o n  on the more 
modern farms, but this was not always the case. For the more t r ad it io na l farms the 
re g r e s s i o n s  cl e a r l y  r ej ec te d the h y p o th es is  that more than 4 y e a r s  of p ri m a r y  
education had any s i g n i f i ca nt  impact on farm p r o d u c t i v i t y . 27 Given that most of 
agricu l t u r e  in Thail a n d  is still very much based on t ra di ti on al  t e c h n o l o g i e s ,  exc e p t  
in the more advan c e d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  areas, this fi n d i n g  s ug ge s t s  that for the m a j o r i t y  
of farm h ou se ho l ds  having more than pr i m a r y  e du ca ti on  does not pay very much.
2 6 .  T h e  a n a l y s e s  w e r e  a l s o  c o n f i n e d  t o  o n l y  t h e  u r b a n  a r e a s  d u e  t o  
u n a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  c r u c i a l  d a t a  o n  t h e  p l a c e  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  f o r  t h o s e  i n  
t h e  r u r a l  a r e a s .
2 7 .  S e e  J a m i s o n  a n d  L a u  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ,  t a b l e  6 - 2 .
Given that e m p l o y m e n t  in a g r i c u l t u r e  a c c o u n t s  tor around 707. of total 
employment, the f i n d i n g s  of J am is o n  and Lau appear to mean that for most workers, 
there is little e c on o m i c  be n e f i t  in g e tting e d u c a ti on  beyond the primary level.
This view is r e i n f o r c e d  when our own earlier f i n d i n gs  on the lack of s i gn i f i c a n t  
educational e f f e c t s  on w ag e s of e m p l o y e es  in the informal sector is taken into 
account. Only in the formal sector is there a clear benefit to getting educated 
beyond the p ri m a r y  level.
As the level of e d u c a t i o n  increases, one finds that a higher p r o p o r ti on  of 
workers at that p a r t i c u l a r  level of e du ca ti on  are emplo y e d  in the formal sector. As 
was a l ready c l ear from t ab l e  5.2, even just looking at g o ve r n m e n t  e mp lo ym en t (a part 
of the formal s e c t o r ) ,  as the level of e d u c a t io n i n c r e a s e s  a higher p r o p o r t io n are 
found in g o v e r n m e n t  e m pl o y m e n t ;  an e x c e pt io n is the teacher train i n g  group, but this 
reflects the p r e d o m i n a n c e  Qf the g o v e r n m e n t  as the suppl i e r  of e d u c a t i o n  in 
Thai 1 a n d .
These f i n d i n g s  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  as follows. The expec t e d  reward for 
education is r o u g h l y  the w e i g h t e d  a ve ra g e  of the r e wa r d s  in va r i o u s  forms of 
employment, i n c l u d i n g  s e l f - e m p l o y m e n t ,  the formal market for employees, and the 
informal market for e m p l o y e e s . 20 T h ose with r e l a t i v el y low levels of e d u c at io ns  are 
mostly e mp lo ye d in a g r i c u l t u r e  and in the informal sector, and thus the r ew ar d s  to 
education in t he s e  f or m s of e m p l o y m e n t  will have the great e s t  weight in d et er mi ni ng  
the a v erage e x p e c t e d  r e w a r d  to e d uc a t i o n .  As the level of e du c a t i o n  increases, the 
formal sector b e c o m e s  m o r e  i m p o r t an t in d et e r m i n i n g  the r e wards to e d u c a t io n as more 
and more are to be found in the formal sector. It is likely that this will lead to 
the rewards for e d u c a t i o n  ris i n g  faster and faster as the level of e d u c a t i o n  
increases. F o r m a l l y,  s u p p o s e  we just ass u m e  that a worker can either end up in the 
formal or the i n f o r m a l  se c t o r ,  also assume that BF(E) is the lifetime d is c o u n t e d  
benefit for an a mo u n t  of e d u c a t i o n  E above the p r im a r y  level in the formal sector,
BI is the ( l i f e t i m e  d i s c o u n t e d )  b en ef it  in the informal sector (assumed to be
20. T h e  e x p e c t e d  r e w a r d  s h o u l d  a l s o  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  p o s s i b l e
p e r i o d s  o f  o p e n  u n e m p l o y m e n t .
indepe n d e n t  o-f E), and P(E) is the p r o b a b i l i t y  of an individual with e d u c a t i on  E 
getting into the formal sector, then the e x p e c t ed  benefit, XB(E), is given b y : 2 *
X B (E ) = P ( E ) .BF (E) + ( l - P ( E ) ) .BI
A ss u m e  that P'(E) > 0, B F (E ) > BI, and B F ’ (E) > 0. Then,
XB'(E) = P ' (E ) . ( B F ( E ) - B I ) + P( E ) . B F ' ( E )  > 0, and
X B " (E ) = P" (E ) . (BF(E)-BI) + 2 . P ’ (E ).BF ' (E ) + P( E ) . B F " ( E )
XB"(E) will be gr e a t e r  than zero if P(E) and BF(E) are a p p r o x i m a t e l y  linear,
or do not show too much concavity.
The s i t u at io n on the cost side of e d u c a t i on  in T h a i l a nd  would tend also to 
make the net b en ef i t  rise more r a pi d l y  as the level of e d u c a t i o n  increases.
Subs i d i e s  are h i gh e s t  for higher e d u c a t io n,  and costs are r e l a t i v e l y  high at the 
seco n d a r y  l e v e l , 30 see for e x am p l e  S u s s an gk ar n,  Ashakul and Myers (1986), c h apter 6, 
also Chutikul (1987) and N i t u n g k o r n  (1987). In the rural areas, where a c c e s s i b i l i t y  
to formal sector jobs may be much more d i ff i c u l t ,  the net b en ef it  may a ct ua l l y  be 
negative for most e d uc a ti on al  levels above the p r im a r y  level, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  at 
the s e c o n d a r y 1e v e l .
The above d i s c u s s i o n s  shed light on the e n r o l l m en t p a tt e r n  in Thailand. For 
most people, there is no real b en ef it  to ge t t i n g  e d u c a t i o n  bey o n d  the p ri m a r y  level.
Seco n d a r y  e n r o l l m e n t  are t h e r e f o r e  r e l a t i v e l y  low. As the level of e d u c a t i o n
increases, howev e r ,  the p r o b a b i l i t y  of g e tt i n g  a formal sector job ( p a r ti cu la rl y a 
gov e r n m e n t  job) r i ses rapid l y ,  and for those with r e l a t i v e l y  easy acc e s s  to higher 
e d ucation the net payoff to ge t t i n g  e du ca te d right up to the t e rt ia ry  level is high. 
Thus, w h ile e n r o l l m e n t  at the s e c o n d a r y  level is low, there is a great d e ma n d  for 
c on ti nu at io n  on to the h i gh e r  e d u c a t i o n  level, and this e x p l a i n s  the r a th e r  high 
enr o l l m e n t  r a t i o  at the higher e d u c a t i o n  level in T h ailand.
C le ar l y the a p p a r e nt  i m b a l a n c e  in the e d u c a ti on al  e n r o l l m e n t  f i gu r e s  in 
table 5.1 are r e la te d to d i f f e r e n c e s  in labour market and e mp l o y m e n t  s t r u c t u r e s  in
29 .  I g n o r i n g  p e r i o d s  o-f u n e m p l o y m e n t . .
30 .  I n c l u d i n g  b o t h  m o n e t a r y  a n d  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  c o s t s .
the v a ri o u s  c o un t r i e s .  We l e arned from s e ction 3 that the share of e m p l o y me nt  in 
a g r i c u l t u r e  in T ha il an d is very high when compa r e d  to the share of v a l u e - ad de d from 
a g ri c u l t u r e .  To some ext e n t  this r e fl ec ts  main r e l i a n c e  on rather traditional 
fa r m i n g  p r ac ti ce s,  with r e l a t i v e l y  little capital inputs, leading to low v a lu e- ad de d 
per head in a g r i cu lt ur e.  From the Ja m i s o n  and Lau study, this would tend to lead to 
low d e ma n d  for e d u c a t i o n  above the p r im a r y  level from farm househ o l d s ,  and this 
helped to e xp l ai n the r e l a t i v e l y  low e n r o l l me nt  ratio at the s e c o n d ar y level in 
Thailand. It is i n t e r e s t i n g  to e x pl or e this line of r e a s o ni ng  in a c r os s- c o u n t r y  
contex t .
U si n g  c r o s s - c o u n t r y  data on 66 low, medium, and upper med i u m  income 
c ou n t r i e s ,  the f o l l o w i n g  r e g r e s s i o n  could ex p l a i n  the r el at iv e e n r o l l me nt  pattern at 
the p r i m a r y  and s e c o n d a r y  levels fairly w e l l : - 31
SCON = .6043 - .5 3 4 # S E M A G  + .0 9 6 1 *R SV SE
(11.16) (-8.2) (1.603)
A d j u s t e d  R 2 = .5756
Here, S C O N  is the r at i o  of s e c o n d a r y  enr o l l m e n t  to p r im a r y  e n ro ll me nt  in 
1980. It is t a ken as an i n d i c at or  of the t e n d e n cy  for i nd i v i d u a l s  to c o n t i n ue  on 
above p r i m a r y  e d u c a t io n.  SEMAG is the share of e m p l o y me nt  in a g ri c u l t u r e  in 19B0. 
RSVSE is the r at io  of the share of v a lu e - a d d e d  from a g r i c u l t u r e  to the s h are of 
e m p l oy me nt  in a g r i c u l t u r e .  It is an indi c a t o r  of the d i f f e r e n c e  in v a lu e - a d d e d  per 
worker b e t w e e n  a g r i c u l t u r e  and n o n - a g r i c u l t u r e .  Higher RSVSE indi c a t e s  a smaller 
gap b e tw e e n  the v a l u e - a d d e d  per head in a g r i c u l tu re  and in n o n - ag ri cu lt ur e.
The r e g r e s s i o n  is c o n s i s t e n t  with what we have learned from the above 
d is cu s s i o n s .  C o u n t r i e s  in which the share of e m p l o y me nt  in a g ri c u l t u r e  are high are 
g e n e r a ll y the ones with low c o n t i n u a t i o n  to the s ec on da ry  level. The s i g n i f i c a n c e  
of S EM A G  is very high, and in fact t h rough va r i o u s  r e g r es si on  e xp e r i m e n t s  using 
a l t e r n a t i v e  v a r i a b l e s  that were tried, this v a r i a bl e is the most s i g n if ic an t in 
e x p l a i ni ng  the t e n d e n c y  for c o n t i n u a t i o n  on to the s e c o n d a r y  level. RSVSE is almost 
s i gn i f i c a n t  at the 107. level and has the e x p e c t e d  sign. C o u n t r i e s  with r e l a t i v e l y
i
31 .  ’ D a t a  a r e ' f r o m  v a r i o u s  i s s u e s  o f  t h e  W o r l d  D e v e l o p m e n t  R e p o r t .
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more even d i s t r i b u t i o n  b e tw e e n  the share of e mp l o y m e n t  in a g r i c u l t u r e  and the share 
of v a l u e - a d d e d  from a g r i c u l t u r e  tend to have higher c o n t i n u a t i o n  beyond the p ri ma r y  
level. In general, c o u n t r i e s  with higher RSVSE are the ones with higher v a l u e - a d d e d  
per worker in a g ri cu lt ur e,  and one would expect these to be the ones using 
r e l a t i v e l y  more modern fa r m i n g  te c h n o l o g y .  If the f in di ng s of J a mison and Lau were 
true for many c o u n t r ie s , then the ones with the higher R S VS E' s will tend to show 
greater return to s e c o n d a r y  e du ca ti on  in a g r i cu lt ur e and hence more i n c e n t i ve s for 
i n d i vi du al s  to c o n t i n u e  beyond the p r im a r y  l e v e l . 32
It is also i nt e r e s t i n g  to see what this e q u a t io n p r ed ic ts  about the 
s e co n d ar y e n r o l l m e n t  r at i o  in T ha il a n d  c o m p a r e d  to the actual ratio. From the 
equation, the p r e d i c t e d  s e c o n d a ry  e n r o l l m en t ratio in T ha il an d turns out to be 24.57. 
c o m p a r e d  to the actual value of 297.. The d i f f er en ce  is not too large, but it is 
i nt er es ti n g to note that the p r e d i c t e d  value is a c t u a ll y lower and not hig h e r  than
the actual value. Thus, it a p pe ar s that Thail a n d  has just about the e xp ec te d ratio 
of s e c o n d a r y  e n r o l l m e n t  given its very large share of e mp l o y m e n t  in a g r i c u l t u r e  and 
the large d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e e n  v a l u e - a d d e d  per worker in a g r i c u l t u r e  and in non-
a gr ic u l t u r e ,  with if a n yt hi ng  a s li gh t l y  higher ratio than to be expected.
The a n a l y s e s  in this se c t i o n  show that the e n r o ll me nt  s t r u c t u re  in T h ai la nd
can be u n d e r s t o o d  f a ir l y  well if we take into account the e mp l o y m e n t  s t r u c t u r e  and
the way the labour mar k e t  works in r e la ti on  to the r e wa rd s for education. The low 
e n r o l lm en t  at the s e c o n d a r y  level is mai n l y  due to the p r e d o m i n a n c e  of e m p l o y m e n t  in 
a g r i c u l tu re  t o ge t h e r  with the fact that the re w a r d s  to e d u c at io n in a g r i c u l t u r e  is 
very low or n o n - e x i s t e n t . 33 What ap p e a r s  to be an i m b a l a n ce  from table 5.1 is so 
because of the very high share of e mp l o y m e n t  in a g r i c u l t u r e  in T h ailand, and is
related to the i m b a l a nc e b e tw e e n  the e m p l oy me nt  and p r o d u c t i o n  s t r u ct ur e d i s c u s s e d
32 .  T h e  s i m p l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  h e r e  o f  c o u r s e  i g n o r e s  a l l  t h e  s u p p l y  
• f a c t o r s  that, c a n  i n f l u e n c e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l s ,  a n d  t h e  
c o s t s  o f  s e c o n d a r y  e d u c a t i o n .  I n f a c t ,  t h e s e  s u p p l y  f a c t o r s  m a y  a l s o  
b e  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  t h e  s h a r e  o f  e m p l o y m e n t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  s o  a r e  p a r t  
of t h e  r e a s o n  w h y  3 E M A G  i s  s o  h i g h l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e  e q u a t i o n .
33 .  T h e  l a c k  o f  r e w a r d  i n  t h e  i n f o r m a l  m a r k e t  f o r  e m p l o y e e s  o f  c o u r s e  
a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  l o w  e n r o l l m e n t .
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in se c t i o n  3 above. The rather high e nr ol lm en t o-f higher e du ca ti on  is also 
e x p l a i n a b l e  -from the s t r u c t u r e  o-f the labour market, in which the better e d u c a t e d  
are mostly e mp lo ye d in the formal sectors, with high re t u r n s  to education. While 
most peo p l e  do not c o n t i n u e  on to s e c o n d a ry  e d u c ation, most that do set their sights 
on higher e d u c at io n and do not g e n e ra ll y des i r e  s e c o n d a r y  e d u c a t i on  for its own 
sake.
b . ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
As T h a i l a n d takes the path to w a r d s  a more rapid industrial growth, it is 
clear from the a na ly se s  of the p r ev io us  s ec ti on s that the issues c o n c er ni ng  the 
balance b e tween the e m p l oy m en t and p r o d u c t i o n  s tr u c t u r e s  and the b a la nc e b e tw e e n  the 
locational d i s t r i b u t i o n  of p o p u l a t i o n  and of p r o d uc ti on  needs to be c a r e f u l ly  
m o nitored and planned. Only by f o l l ow in g a d e v e lo pm en t t r a n s i ti on  that will c o rrect 
the cu r r e n t  i m b a l a n c e s  will the b en ef i t s  of econo m i c  d e ve l o p m e n t  be spr e a d  out more 
evenly.
By de f a u l t  this will happen, as p eo p l e  will adjust and move to w h e r e  ever 
the e c o n o m ic  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  are. The p ro c e s s  may be a slow one, but if a g r i c u l t u r e  
cont i n u e s  to stag n a t e ,  and d i s p a r i t i e s  widen c o n t i n ua ll y,  more and more p eo p l e  will 
move into the Gr e a t e r  B a ng k o k  area. The g ov er nm en t does not seem to be in a 
position to s i mp l y  act p a ss i v e l y .  Given the past imbala n c e s ,  it is likely that 
changes will occur quickly, p a r t i c u l a r l y  given the c u rr e n t  d y na m i s m  of m a n u f a c t u r e d  
exports.
A three prong a p p r o a ch  a p pe a r s  to be called for.
1. F ur th e r  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  d e v e l o p m e n t  in the G r ea t e r  B a ngkok area, 
p a r t i c ul ar ly  in the 5 s u r r o u n d i n g  C h a n gwats.
2. D e v e l o p m e n t s  of a l t e r n a t i v e  gro w t h  poles to the G r ea te r B a ng k o k  area 
focussing on labour i n t e n s i ve  i n dustries.
3. Rural d e v e l o p m e n t  p r o g r a m s  to ease the h ar ds h i p  in the rural areas for 
those in b ac kw ar d areas who cannot easily, r e lo ca te  due to v a ri o u s  factors.
These t h ree a p p r o a c h e s  should not be thought of as a l t e r n at iv es . All are 
necessary. In fact t h ese are s c he m e s  that are a lr ea dy  in g o v e r n m e n t  plans. The 
real q u e s t i o ns  are r ea ll y ones c o n c e r n i n g  size, and a p p r o p r i a t e  mi x t u r e  of the 
different a p p r o a ch es . One thing that is clear is that the w id en in g of the c ur re nt  
imbalances and i mp li e d  income d i s p a r i t i e s  sho u l d  not be a l lowed to a c celerate. This 
can lead to s e ri o u s  p r o b l e m s  c o n c e r n i n g  social s t ab i l i t y ,  and also political 
stability. What is also clear is that a g r i c u l t u r e  c an n o t  c o n t i n u e  to s u pp o r t  the
very large s h are of e m p l o y m e n t  as at present. Sim i l a r l y ,  the poorer r eg i o n s  such as 
the N o r t h- ea st  cannot c o n t i n u e  to su p p o r t  such a d i s - p r o p o r t i o n a t e  share of the 
p op u l a t i o n  as at present.
I
Human r e s o u r c e  i n v e st me nt  t hr ou g h  e d u c a ti on  also cannot be ignored. While 
se c t i o n  5 showed that the e d u c a ti on al  p at te r n  is e x p l a i n a b l e  with r e f e r e n c e  to the 
e mp l o y m e n t  and labour market s t r u cture, the latter is part of the cu r r e n t  p ro bl em  of 
i m b a l a n ce s  that have to be tackled. Major ch a n g e s  are underway. The s ou rc es  of 
e m p l o y m en t for those with r e l a t i v e l y  better e d u c a t i on  are a lr ea d y  c ha ng in g with the 
policy, e f f e c t i v e  since around 1904, to limit civil s er vi c e  gro w t h  to only 2'/. per 
annum, down from almost 10*/. per annum since around the mid 70's. The cu r r e n t  rapid 
growth of m a n u f a c t u r i n g  should help ease the t r a n si ti on  toward a l e ading role for 
the p ri va t e sec t o r  as the a b s o r b e r  of the better educated. With m o v e m e n t s  of 
e mp lo ym e nt  away from a g ri c u l t u r e ,  t h ere are likely to be more and more demand for 
s e c o n d a r y e d u c ation. F i n a l l y ,  e d u c a t i o n  p l a n n in g must be c o n s i s t e n t  with p o li c i e s  
c on c e r n i n g  p o p u l a t i o n  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n .
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